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Abstract 
 
Examining the sources of Internet activism, this paper first provides an 
extensive literature review of nationalism and the Internet in China and South 
Korea.   Adding to Zheng’s theory of partial technological empowerment in 
China, I ask two general questions (Zheng, 2008; Foucault, 1991): If there is 
partial technological empowerment in China, what is the relationship between 
Internet exposure and nationalism?  And if the theory of partial technological 
empowerment holds, how will it differ from other countries like South Korea?   
This study investigated the relationship between Internet exposure and 
general and blind nationalism.  Using ethnicity and Internet exposure as 
independent variable and general and blind nationalism as a dependent variable, 
387 students from Tsinghua and Yonsei University were surveyed.  Three 
hypotheses were tested: first, I predicted that Yonsei University students will 
demonstrate higher Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and long-term) than 
the Tsinghua University students; second, building on the premise that the 
Internet is tightly controlled by the Chinese government, partly with the goal of 
promoting state-aligned nationalism, I predicted that Internet exposure (yesterday, 
typical day, and long-term) would be positively related to both general and blind 
nationalism among Tsinghua University students; third, I predicted the 
relationship between Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and long-term) 
and general and blind nationalism among Yonsei University students will be 
weaker than in Tsinghua University students.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Definition of Nationalism 
 
The definition of nationalism offered by scholars of social science has evolved 
over time.  In 1915, Page argued that nationalism was a sense of positive 
identification with, and feelings of affective attachment to, one’s country (Page, 
1915).  However, other psychologists and social scientists demurred.  For 
instance, Kirscht’s (1967) research on nationalism disapproved of the definition 
by pointing out that the methodology of conceptualizing nationalism was flawed.  
Alternatively, other research disapproved of previous definitions by giving more 
distinguishing explanations.  In their work, Ray et al. (1984) defined nationalism 
as “less chauvinistic than other forms of intergroup discrimination such as ethno-
centricism.” 
Numerous theoretical distinctions were proposed by other scholars.  Boure 
(1946) distinguished nationalism by examining the military and civic form of 
patriotism.  Similarly, Morray (1959) pointed out that there is a clear distinction 
between patriotism of imitation and disobedience, and patriotism of innovation 
and disobedience.  Other scholars like Ardono et al. (1995) made a distinction 
between pseudo-nationalism (i.e., blind attachment) and genuine nationalism (i.e., 
love of country and attachment to national values based on critical thinking). 
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Building on this, Schatz et al. (1999) offered two distinct theoretical 
concepts of nationalism that were particularly important in contemporary political 
movements:  blind and constructive nationalism.  Schatz et al. defined blind 
nationalism as “intolerance of criticism, unquestioning loyalty, and rejection of 
other nations as out groups.”  He then went on to say that the opposite, 
constructive nationalism, is defined as “an attachment to a country that is 
characterized by positive allegiance, understanding of other countries and 
practical support towards one’s country” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 151).  While the 
theoretical component of nationalism is an important part of defining it, the geo-
historical debate on nationalism is also significant. 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins 
and Spread of Nationalism has stirred significant debate since its publication.  In 
his book, Anderson argued that civic nationalism was socially constructed and 
imagined (Anderson, 1986, p. 203; Ignatieff, 1994, p. 3-4).  He then went on to 
say that Western countries were the first ones to imagine nationalism, followed by 
the countries in Africa and Asia.  However, scholars like Chatterjee doubted 
Anderson’s premises about the core-peripheral pattern of nationalism.  In The 
Nation and Its Fragments, he challenged Anderson’s assumption that countries in 
Africa and Asia could do nothing more than follow the path of the West.  He 
exclaimed in his book, “If the rest of the world had no choice but to follow 
Europe, what was there to imagine?” (Chatterjee, 1993). 
Chatterjee demonstrated that Anderson’s perception of national identity 
and nation-state is susceptible to criticism.  In the later chapter of the book, 
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Chatterjee argued that “nationalists’ imagination in Africa and Asia were posited 
not on identity but on difference from the nationalism propagated by the West” 
(Chatterjee, 1994, pp. 92-94).  To conclude his counter-point, Chatterjee 
illustrated how intellectuals “first imagined the nation into a spiritual dimension 
and then prepared it for a political contest while normalizing the aspirations of the 
minority groups.”  For instance, Chatterjee mentioned that print-nationalism (i.e., 
education) has played a unique role in building consensus in countries in Asia, 
particularly in China (Chatterjee, 1994, p. 170).   
While scholars like Chatterjee argued that post-colonial countries are 
unique when it comes to constructing nationalism, there are also geo-historical 
variables that can differ from each country to another.  Given this, the following 
chapter discusses the historical backgrounds of China and South Korea. 
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History of Nationalistic Movements in China 
Sentiments surrounding the superiority of Chinese civilization are a broad topic, 
but in order to decipher the dimensions of Chinese nationalism, one must first 
examine the internal and external influences on Chinese history that helped spark 
the expansion of nationalism.  Schwarcz describes a few historical periods in 
modern Chinese history: first, the unfolding of Chinese enlightenment around 
1919, which marked the conflict between nationalism and cultural critique; 
second, a century of humiliation, which was a period of colonization and foreign 
occupation; third, the May 4
th
 movement, which was triggered by anti-foreignism; 
fourth, the December 9
th
 movement, which was directed towards the Japanese 
(Schwarcz, 1986); fifth, the post-Tiananmen movements, which introduced 
Western ideals (Gries, 2006, p. 5). 
 
The Enlightenment and Values 
Like the European enlightenment, the Chinese enlightenment had many 
obstacles and complicated issues (Schwarcz, 1986).  For instance, one difference 
between the Chinese and European enlightenments was the fact that Chinese 
intellectuals were dealing with “the old habits of self-repressive authoritative rule 
rather than theological dictate” (Schwarcz, 1986).  The officials in China did not 
want to change the power structure, so that they could stay in power longer, 
thereby blocking any political activity within China.  But the problem with this 
concept was not so much about self-repressive authoritative rule per se, but about 
“the attempts to console themselves with the triumph of scientific truth over blind 
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belief” (Schwarcz, 1986).  As a result, in combination with the dogmatic style of 
the officials, the spread of the enlightenment was directly impeded by ongoing 
critique among the Confucian scholars and officials. 
Reflecting upon the European experience, Schwarcz (1986) also 
contended that the spirit of change lost momentum because of the remaining 
Confucian values, the lijiao (a ritualized subordination).  The Confucian values 
“three ropes and five bonds” (sangang wuchang), which explicitly describe the 
hierarchical structure, was reinforced through civil exams; thus, the persistence of 
the “ethic of filial piety meeting the needs of imperial bureaucratic state” was 
another hindrance to social movements.  According to Moody (1988), these 
sentiments eventually became identified with Confucian values, which then were 
turned into a more chauvinistic view of Chinese civilization. 
Throughout the late 1800s, officials who subscribed to the Confucian 
ideology paid special attention to increasing the power of the state and enduring 
in the face of foreign influence (Schwarcz, 1986).  And in the late 1880s, in an 
attempt to change the course of foreign encounters, a scholar named Zhang 
Zhidong suggested to officials a dual-track approach: “Chinese learning as the 
goal, Western learning as the means” (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong) (Gries, 
2004).  However, this formula had benefits as well as negative effects.  While it 
united the people, it assumed that Chinese learning is essentially superior to 
Western learning.  Thereafter, recognizing the chasm between Chinese and 
Western learning, the Chinese turned inward and pursued the path of national 
salvation (Schwarcz, 1986, p. 101). 
6 
 
In her book, The Chinese Enlightenment, Schwarcz argued that the May 
4
th
 movement marked the first of many “incomplete efforts to uproot feudalism 
while pursuing the cause of a nationalist revolution.”  Moody (1988) added that 
these incomplete efforts were due to the mindset of intellectuals and students.  In 
essence, Moody (1988) argued that Chinese intellectuals’ and students’ mindsets 
were labeled democratic, thus the development of social movements was 
restricted by customs.  According to this argument, two important considerations 
were identified: first, movements after the May 4
th
 movement were labeled 
democratic and dangerous because of the traditional Confucianism principles that 
guided the state and society; and, second, the Chinese political culture lacked 
previous social movements that supported the formation of alternative social 
groups (Moody, 1988).  The early stages of the enlightenment in the late 1800s 
had an adverse effect on future social movements; the unchanged mindset and a 
lack of political culture helped shape a form of nationalistic sentiment that looked 
inward. 
In addition to the evolving nature of civic nationalism, a closer look at 
modern Chinese history offers a new insight into anti-foreign nationalism.  The 
critical era of the “Century of Humiliation” (bainian guochi) from the mid-
nineteenth century to the mid-twenty century still holds importance for ordinary 
Chinese to this day.  While one may raise questions about the significance of 
history in imagining nationalism (Anderson, 1991), it is a fact that “the weight of 
the past is particularly heavy in China” (Gries, 2005). 
 
7 
 
 
“Century of Humiliation” (Bainian Guochi) 
The “Century of Humiliation” is often cited when scholars of Chinese 
studies broach the topic of nationalism.  According to Gries (2005), this period 
began with China’s defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of 
Hong Kong in 1824.  In addition, this period was marked by Western or Japanese 
occupation: the two Opium Wars in 1856 and 1939, the Sino-Japanese War from 
1894 to 1895, the Boxer Rebellion, and the War of Resistance against Japan from 
1931 to 1945, which included the Nanking Massacre.  These events are 
particularly sensitive to many Chinese.  Those who experienced the occupation 
may be dead, but the images in the textbooks resonate to this day. 
Unilateral demands by Western and Japanese aggressors not only allowed 
exploitations of indemnities and extraterritoriality, but also permitted disgraceful 
acts to be carried out (Gries, 2004).  For instance, the Old Summer Palace outside 
Beijing was looted and burned down by Europeans in 1860 (Clements, 1967).  
Another example is the Nanking Massacre.  The Nanking Massacre is probably 
the most well-known incident that the Chinese government uses to incite 
nationalism against Japan.  Also known as the “Rape of Nanking,” the Nanking 
Massacre was an incident that continues to be narrated in political speeches and 
public discussions to this day in China (Chang, 1998).   
In November 1937, Japanese troops took control of Jiangsu province, 
which includes Nanking city.  Under the Japanese occupation, over 300,000 
Chinese civilians were killed.  According to Chang (1997), male and female 
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civilians of all ages were raped and tortured by the Japanese army.  Soon after the 
occupation, international military tribunals determined that the Imperial Japanese 
Army had carried out war crimes such as mass rape, looting, and execution of 
innocent civilians (Chang, 1997, p. 89).  However, these findings were disputed 
by Japanese historians, who claimed that the casualty rates were underreported 
and certain incidents simply were not recorded.  This ignited demonstrations at 
the Japanese embassy in Beijing (Marquadt, 2005).   
While specific incidents like the Nanking Massacre ignited violent 
nationalistic protest, the “Century of Humiliation” was more than a mere 
invention (Gries, 2006).  Rather, this era had two important effects on ordinary 
Chinese: first, it permanently destroyed the principles of reciprocity and respect; 
second, Chinese people realized that they should make sure that this will never 
happen again (Gries, 2006).  As LaCapra (1998) notes in the discussion of the 
Holocaust, “Trauma brings about a lapse or rupture in memory that breaks 
continuity with the past.”  Therefore, events like the Nanking Massacre convinced 
the Chinese people that their country was vulnerable to foreign imperialism, thus 
raising more nationalistic sentiment. 
 
The May 4
th
 Movement: The First Nation-Wide Student Rebellion 
The May 4
th
 movement in 1919, the December 9
th
 movement in 1935, and 
the 1989 Tiananmen movement are said to be the largest student movements in 
Chinese history (Zhao, 2007).  These movements were all initiated in Beijing by 
students.  The significance of the movements goes even further.  All three of the 
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movements, as pointed out by Zhao (2001), had specific targets audiences: the 
Chinese government and foreigners.  Therefore, scholars often refer to these three 
movements to understand China’s modern anti-foreign nationalism. 
The May 4
th
 movement was the first student-led demonstration to spread 
across the nation.  During that time, China was in a difficult situation because it 
had entered into World War I on the side of Allied Triple Entente in 1917, with 
Shendong controlled by Germany (Meisner, 1977).   But after the victory, the 
Allied Triple Entente forces refused to return the territorial rights of Shandong to 
China.  Subsequently, Shendong was transferred to the Japan, and Britain 
occupied Hong Kong until 1997.  Yet another incident that triggered anti-foreign 
nationalism was when about 140,000 Chinese laborers were sent to France 
without compensation (Bin, 1997).   These events once again violated the 
principles of Chinese principles and values.  The breaking of promises by 
Western countries not only marked an era initiating a permanent loss of trust in 
Western countries, but sparked a new form nationalism that was geared towards 
foreigners. 
The May 4
th
 movement had a ripple effect on Chinese society at that time.  
On May 4
th
, 1919, over 3,000 students from Beijing University and students from 
other Universities gathered around Tiananmen Square to protest (Zhao, 2001).  
During the demonstrations, many voiced their opinions by shouting out that the 
Chinese government was weak.  They not only criticized their own government 
for its weak response to the foreign incursions, but also for the foreign occupation 
(Zhao, 2001). 
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The December 9
th
 Movement 
To some observers, the December 9
th
 movement seemed like it was led by 
May 4
th
 veterans and a new generation of patriotic students.  According to 
Schwarcz (1986), Citizen Society founder and professor Xu Deheng actively took 
part in orchestrating the December 9
th
 movement.  Other observers, however, 
disagreed.  Scholars like Hym Wales argued that ordinary professors did not 
actively participate in the movement; rather, some sought to counsel the students 
to study (Schwarcz, 1986, p. 218; Wales, 1959).  While some professors did 
engage and others did not, professors knew that they were better prepared to 
contribute to the December 9
th
 movement (Schwarcz, 1986, p. 219).  However, 
traces of doubt and disappointment from the previous movement still lingered. 
This doubt mainly came from a fear that overwhelming nationalistic 
sentiment would quickly turn anti-Confucian.  This likelihood, according to 
Schwarcz (1986), materialized in the December 9
th
 movement.  Therefore, the 
students and the intellectuals were somewhat skeptical about whether or not this 
new anti-feudal movement would succeed.  One of the main differences between 
the May 4
th
 movement and the December 9
th
 movement was the fact that there 
was a generational gap, mainly marked by political ideology and state loyalty. 
While the May 4
th
 movement was pro-democratic and nationalistic 
according to some observers, the December 9
th
 movement was geared towards the 
Japanese occupation.  After the occupation of Dongbei and Hebei province in 
1935, Beijing was virtually surrounded by the Japanese (Zhao, 2001).  On 
December 9
th
, 1935, thousands of students protested in the streets of Beijing to 
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urge the government to resist the occupation.  The implications of the 
demonstrations were astounding.  While this event gave an opportunity to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to build a base in an urban setting, thus driving 
out the Guomindang, it also created an ad hoc joint force between the 
Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (Meisner, 1977).  As such, anti-
foreign nationalism not only played a critical role in prodding the government, but 
also in unifying the country. 
The December 9
th
 movement was more than just an anti-Japanese 
movement that united intellectuals and students.  It proved that Chinese 
intellectuals and students were willing and able to protest under any political 
conditions.  In other words, the students were not afraid of their government or 
the Japanese military.  They sought to uphold the government’s previous promise 
to keep their country free from foreign influence.   
 
The Tiananmen Square Movement 
In comparison to the May 4
th
 and December 9
th
 movements, the 
Tiananmen Square movement had three different features: first, the Tiananmen 
Square movement was more pro-Western in appearance; second, it reflected the 
Cultural Revolution and other mass movement styles; and third, it employed 
democratic rhetoric (Zhao, 2001). 
During the Tiananmen Square movement, students flashed the V-sign to 
show victory and built the Goddess of Democracy to embrace Western ideals 
(Image 4).  The importance of the movement was not related to its grievances 
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over the deprivation of democratic ideals, but to the fact that it was pro-Western; 
there were English words demanding democracy on the banners.  Slogans such as 
“Give me Democracy or Give me Death” and “People Power” frequently 
appeared in the demonstration (Zhao, 2001). 
Another reason why the Tiananmen Square movement was so intriguing is 
the fact it took placed when China was not colonized or fighting a war (Zhao, 
2001).  In 1989, imperialism and foreign aggression were seen as history.  
Nonetheless, the Tiananmen Square movement resembled other mass movements 
in the past.  In other words, there was no anti-foreign influence, yet thousands 
gathered to advocate for political change.  For the first time, anti-foreign 
nationalism was not a factor in social movement formation. 
Yet another attribute that was different from previous movements was the 
fact that Chinese intellectuals and students had access to diverse 
telecommunication systems.  Telecommunications and other information 
technology had not been prevalent in the previous two movements.  For instance, 
in the case of Tiananmen Square movement, fiber optics systems and the Internet 
were already introduced to government agencies and academic fields (Zhao, 
2007).  This allowed the Chinese intellectuals and the students to publish and 
share information that could have changed their views.  While it may be difficult 
to argue that new information technologies had a direct effect on the political 
mobilization techniques, there is overwhelming evidence that the content of the 
protests was affected by Western ideals (Zheng, 2007, p. 1).  The Tiananmen 
Square movement was different from other mass movement because the 
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introduction of new ideas through information technologies allowed students to 
reinvent themselves as more global-oriented citizens, thus changing the nature of 
social movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Old Nationalism, New Era:  
Youth Demonstrations in the Post-Tiananmen Era 
Nationalism is an inherently parochial, irrational, and extremely destructive force 
that ultimately runs counter to the interests of human development.  It should only 
be called on extreme circumstances, such as in resisting foreign invasion, and not 
otherwise used to stir passions and excitement. 
 
The Three Gorges Project: A Symbol of Uncontrolled Development (Qing, 1999) 
 
 Before the 1980s, the Chinese government did not acknowledge or realize 
how Western ideals influenced Chinese youth.  Ignoring the signs, the Chinese 
government followed rigid values in educational institutions and adherence to 
authority (Schwarcz, 1986).   Nonetheless, recent research by Drissel (2008) 
pointed out that “the advent of visible Chinese youth subcultures, a phenomenon 
denounced yet conditionally tolerated by the regime, coincided with the birth of 
Chinese rock and roll (yaogun) in the mid-1980s.”  Drissel (2008) went on to 
explain that after the Tiananmen Square movement, there were new hybridized 
sub-cultural identities among the youth that skillfully challenged the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  While Drissel (2008) does provide evidence that 
“adherents of subcultures gradually reinvented the nature of student rebellions” by 
slowly violating social norms, it is important to realize that information 
technologies such as the Internet also had some influence.  By examining digitally 
mobilized incidents like the 1999 Chinese embassy incidents and the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic torch relay protests, one can understand how the Internet impacted 
nationalistic movements in China (Hughes, 2006, p. 86).  
 Following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, 
thousands of Chinese University students protested in front of the United States 
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embassy in Beijing (Image 5).  Moments after the incident, the United States 
president, Bill Clinton, issued a public apology to the Chinese government.  
However, this was not enough.  Believing that the bombings were intentional, 
thousands of Chinese students gathered around the United States embassy in 
Beijing to protest.  Within hours, the embassy was surrounded by thousands of 
angry students.  While the incident was eventually worked out by the two 
governments, it proved that Chinese students were not going to step back from 
any aggression from the West. 
On the other hand, China has also experienced dynamic forms of 
nationalism.  For instance, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) symbolized its strength in the world economy.  The 2008 Beijing Olympic 
activities and the successful launch of a manned spaceship also served as 
opportunities to secure China’s place in the global political arena.  However, these 
achievements did not directly lead them to believe that global recognition and 
globalization was beneficial to China.  Instead, these events created a divergent 
effect on the Chinese society. 
Examining these technology-motivated events, Li (2008) noted that three 
distinctive forms of nationalism developed after globalization was introduced in 
China: left-wing nationalism, which takes a critical view of globalization; right-
wing nationalism, which acknowledges globalization but carries strong feelings 
against Japan; and a neutral stance on the part of those who do not subscribe to 
either of the two, but still abhor the United States or Japan (Li, 2008).  However, 
this dynamic can be different among the younger generations.  The current youth 
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generations are very different from the older generations in China.  Demographic 
factors not only play a significant role in political views, but also in predicting 
their level of anti-foreignism or nationalism. 
 
The Prince and Princesses in China 
The current youth generations in China are the center of attention in all 
aspects of life.  Most of them do not have siblings and enjoy many benefits such 
as educational and social opportunities (Hughes, 2006).  And since the Chinese 
government adopted the One-Child policy, many parents have unwillingly 
invested all of their wealth in their only child.  In addition, Chinese youth are 
different from the previous generation because most of them are in their 20s and 
were born around the 1980s, after the Cultural Revolutions.  Therefore, most of 
them do not recall anything before the 1990s (Gries, 2005).  The mental world of 
current Chinese youth differs from those in the past; current Chinese youth are 
more sympathetic and restrained towards the Chinese government and are 
globally oriented (Hughes, 2006, p. 93-107).  However, a closer look at modern 
Chinese youth textbook controversies offers a different insight. 
The Japanese history text book controversies and Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine were two of the many protested 
events between China and Japan.  When images of the Prime Minister visiting the 
Yasukuni Shrines were televised, anti-Japanese demonstrations were reported 
around the Japanese embassy in Beijing (Marquadt, 1997).  Junichiro Koizumi’s 
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visit to the Yasukuni Shrine proved that nationalism was still strong in China 
among the youth. 
The textbook controversies were one of many events that angered the 
Chinese youth.  In April of 2005 the Japanese Ministry of Education approved a 
history textbook that had decreased the civil causality figures from the Nanjing 
Massacre.  The Japanese government was charged of 124 changes to historical 
facts.  As a result, dozens of Chinese students protested in front of the Japanese 
Consulate in Shanghai to denounce the textbook alterations that the Japanese 
government made (Marquadt, 1997).   
However, Chinese nationalism is not always violent.  For instance, if one 
were to examine the Sichuan Earthquakes in 2008, they would find a sympathetic 
form of Chinese nationalism.  Soon after the earthquakes, the Chinese 
government responded quickly by sending rescue teams and asking the Chinese 
public to volunteer.  While the incident provided the government with some 
opportunity to redirect the media from the Tibetan issue, it also showed how 
united and compassionate Chinese student volunteers were.  Soon after the 
earthquakes, hundreds of Chinese students volunteered to assist in the relief 
efforts (Clark, 2008).  Incidents like this clearly demonstrate the existence of 
sympathetic nationalism.  However, one might observe the incidents surrounding 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relays differently. 
Soon after the initiation of the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relays, Chinese 
youth groups demonstrated throughout cities in China and Chinese Diaspora 
communities around the world (Figure 6), sometimes violently, in response to 
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anti-Olympic demonstrators (Burns, 2008).  However, not all protests were 
violent.  For instance, protests in Washington, D.C., occurred peacefully (Nolt, 
2008), whereas in more liberal countries like France and South Korea, Chinese 
protestors were more violent towards out-groups (Image 6).  This suggests that 
the demographics of student communities can be a factor in shaping how the 
protests will turn out.   
While the demonstrators in different countries have different protest styles 
(i.e., slogans, target audiences, target locations, etc.), the overarching goal of the 
2008 Beijing Olympic torch relay protests was aimed at the global audience.  By 
holding banners that had English words like those during the Tiananmen Square 
movement, the Chinese students learned that they live in a global era.  And they 
realized that there was a certain protest etiquette by which they must abide.   
One cause could be the introduction of the Internet.  For instance, the 
Internet and other information technologies not only helped mobilize the protest 
against the anti-Olympic demonstrators, but also allowed the Chinese students to 
gain exposure to foreign sources.  However, this does not mean that all Chinese 
students received an identical amount and type of Internet exposure.  As the case 
at Duke University showed, Chinese foreign exchange students living in other 
countries can hold a stronger nationalistic sentiment than those residing in China. 
The Duke University incident was centered on a Chinese student protest 
on campus.  During the protest, a female Chinese-American student from Duke 
University attempted to mediate between pro-Tibet demonstrators and Chinese 
foreign exchange students, by trying to get the two parties into a dialogue (Image 
19 
 
1).  Within moments, she was quickly surrounded by the Chinese foreign 
exchange students and harshly denounced (Dewan, 2008).  This incident 
demonstrated two key behaviors: first, the Chinese foreign exchange students 
were politically conservative enough to denounce a member of their own group if 
that member refused to subscribe to the given national identity; second, the 
Chinese foreign exchange students and temporary Chinese residents in America 
were more likely to denounce out-groups (Image 1).  The Chinese foreign 
exchange students seemed to demonstrate blind nationalism: intolerance of 
criticism, unquestioning loyalty, and rejection of other nations as out-groups 
(Schatz et. al., 1999). 
The fact of the matter is that Chinese foreign exchange students and 
Chinese-American students have made significant headway in expressing their 
opinions, but they are still politically conservative.  As shown by the Duke 
incident, Chinese youth groups have yet to become politically sensitive to 
opposing views.  Originating from the intellectual-led enlightenment and 
emerging at the apex of globalized society, Chinese youth movements have made 
significant improvements. 
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History of Nationalistic Movements in South Korea 
… I would rather transfer the surge of this sorrow onto the summit of hopefulness.  
As we dread parting when we meet, so, we promise to meet again when we part.  
Though my love is gone, I am not parted from love; an untiring song envelops the 
silence of love. 
 
The Silence of Love (Han, 1926) 
As citizens of a tributary state of China, Koreans have been seen as younger 
brothers by the Chinese since ancient times (Kim, 2000).  To the Koreans, this 
was a submissive position.  In addition, the power shifts which occurred during 
the First and Second Sino-Japanese War reinforced the sentiment of 
insignificance.  As mentioned by Cummings (2005) and Lee (2006), the rise of 
Korean nationalism is attributed to periods of Korean colonization when the Han 
sentiment has played out the most: first, the historical context of Han grief; 
second the Donghak movement, which served as an enlightenment period for the 
Koreans; third, the resistance movements which date back to the 1920s (Shin, 
2006); and fourth, the rise of assertive nationalism in the post-Kwangju incidents 
(Cummings, 2005). 
The book, War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War 
and the Peloponnesian War by McCann and Strauss (2001) is one of the few 
works that reflects upon Greek history to analyze Korean history.  In their work, 
McCann and Strauss (2001) offer a poignant analogy to describe Korea’s position 
in Asia.  In their book, they depict Korea as a shrimp between two whales, 
namely, China and Japan.  
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Korea’s Place in Asia: The Han Sentiment 
Similar to China’s Century of Humiliation, scholars of Korean studies 
often refer to the term Han when they talk about foreign incursions.  The word 
Han, which is not easily understood by foreigners, is often used during and even 
probably to this day, to describe the bitter regret, discontent, sorrow, and misery 
experienced during foreign occupations (Cummings, 2005).  This term also refers 
to the 900 invasions throughout Korea’s recorded history (Oberdorfer, 2001, p. 3).  
Other scholars add that Han is a word that is derived from the Chinese long-lived 
Han dynasty (Edson, 1988).  Despite its derivation, the term has many meanings, 
and Koreans interpret the word differently.  For instance, if ordinary Koreans 
mentioned that they carry Han within their generation, it would not only refer to 
humiliating events such as the Comfort Women incidents, but also to the present 
dependence on superpowers like the United States.  In order to demonstrate how 
terms like Han have played out in Korean history, once must first examine the 
foreign incursions in modern Korean history. 
The Donghak movement of the 1860s, also known as “Eastern 
Scholarship,” was an anti-government, anti-foreign, anti-landlord, religious, and 
political movement that sought to distinguish Korean identity from Chinese and 
Japanese influence (Cummings, 2005).  Unlike China’s May 4
th
 movement, the 
Donghak movement was a movement organized by peasants and intellectuals.  As 
in the case of the May 4
th
 movement, it allowed the peasants to rise against the 
Japanese occupation and the Korean government for its weak response to foreign 
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invasion (Cummings, 2005).  However, what was interesting about the Donghak 
movement was the fact that religion played a critical role in fostering nationalistic 
sentiment. 
Confucianism and Buddhism played prominent roles in the creation of the 
Donghak movement.  The Donghak ideology fostered a nationalistic faith by 
inspiring the peasants through Confucianism and Buddhism.  In addition, leading 
up to the March 1
st
 independence movement of 1919, the Donghak ideology later 
became a model for the rebirth of Korea’s indigenous religion, namely Chungsan-
do (The Way of Chungsan) (Kim, 2003, p. 83-100).  While there might be many 
different definitions, the Chungsan-do religion was, in many senses, a traditional 
way of teaching about a utopian Korea.  In this way, the spread of Donghak led to 
various religious movements that inspired ordinary Koreans.  Therefore, while it 
resembled the May 4
th
 movement in China, this movement was fundamentally 
different.  The Donghak ideology also carried a political idealistic view that 
aimed to pave the way for a political culture for future movements.  In general, 
few sources of nationalism can be found in the expansion of religious movements; 
however, the Donghak movement also had anti-foreign characteristics. 
The Donghak movement attempted to move away from the traditional 
tributary relationship with China.  In order to do so, it promoted ethnic 
nationalism and the subsidiary religious movements that embodied Confucianism 
but opposed Christianity.  For instance, the Kaebyok ideology argued a “New 
Era” mentality, and new forms of Buddhism were introduced (Edson, 1988).  In 
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one sense, the March 1
st
 movement resembled the May 4
th
 movement in that there 
was a struggle between tradition and modernity. 
The Nonviolent Movement on March 1
st
 (Samil Un Dong) 
Cummings (2005) depicted Korean history as a long and harsh path of 
resistance.  In his book, Korea’s Place in the Sun, he focused on the colonial 
period, which brought forth a new set of Korean political leaders.  Incited by both 
domestic and foreign forces, the emergence of nationalism and communism dates 
back to the 1920s (Cummings, 2005, p. 154-157).  But the spark of ancient culture 
and national identity occurred when Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910. 
 The Japanese occupation was probably the most significant factor in the 
upsurge of nationalism in South Korea.  In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.  During 
its 35-year rule, Japanese military commanders, summoned to Korea by the 
Japanese Emperor, carried out coups to overthrow the Cho’e Sun dynasty during 
the occupation (Cummings, 2005).  The Japanese also exploited the Koreans as 
wartime laborers.  It was at this time that the incidents of the Comfort Women 
took place. 
During Japanese rule, thousands of Korean women, also known as 
“Comfort Women,” were systematically rounded up and imprisoned in “comfort 
stations,” where they were repeatedly raped and abused by Japanese military 
personnel (Yoshimi & O’Brien, 1995, p. 1).  These brothels operated throughout 
the Japanese military bases across Asia.  But in the years after the war, the 
Japanese government failed to acknowledge the war crimes.  In an attempt to get 
justice, the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery filed 
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a suit with the Japanese government.  While the Japanese government apologized 
for its “War of Aggression,” it denied reports that Korean women were coerced 
into sexual slavery to service Japanese soldiers (Yoshimi & O’Brien, 1995, p. 3).   
While there were no attempts at genocide, there was an attempt to destroy 
anything that was Korean.  As argued by Matsumura (2007), the Japanese 
succeeded in tightly controlling the Koreans for three decades because they 
destroyed many cultural relics.  Throughout the 35 years of occupation, numerous 
guerilla organizations rose up to recruit young Korean men to fight battles in 
Manchuria (Cummings, 2005).  At home, there were also plans for non-violent 
movements against the Japanese occupation. 
What made the March 1
st
 movement so intriguing was the fact that the 
Koreans, unlike the Chinese, garnered little international attention.  Soon after 
World War I, the United States president Woodrow Wilson invited diplomats 
from 30 different countries to jump start the peace agreements, in an effort to 
create a peaceful world.  While the European powers focused on taking 
preventative measures toward Germany, there was no attention on how they 
should deal with the colonies (New York Times, 1919).  In an attempt to appeal to 
the Western powers, the Korean government in exile sent two delegates to 
petition its case.  However, their admittance was denied, and the two Korean 
diplomats were unable to participate in any activities at the Paris Peace 
Conference (Lee, 2006). 
Wilson’s talk of a just settlement inspired wishful thinking among the 
Koreans.  However, like the May 4
th
 movement in China, the conference was a 
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moment of betrayal for the Koreans.  Nonetheless, adhering to this ideology of 
self-determination, the Koreans led a non-violent movement later that year, which 
came to be called the March 1
st
 movement.  The 1919 movement ignited nation-
wide demonstrations.  This effort was significant for two reasons: first, the 
Japanese knew that the March 1
st
 movement would be significant for Koreans 
because March 1
st
 was the commemoration date of the fall of the last Korean 
imperial dynasty (Lee, 2006); second, it was a nonviolent movement that 
proclaimed independence from the Japanese.  
The Proclamation of Korean Independence was the foundation of the 
movement.  While the main point was to declare independence, the themes of 
nonviolence and inclusiveness were also important as well.  The Korean 
independence protest took place on March 1919 around 2:00 p.m., when thirty-
three campaigners met in Tapgol Park in Seoul and read the Proclamation of 
Korean Independence (Yang, 2005).   The March 1
st
 movement turned quickly 
violent when the Japanese police started to clamp down on the peaceful protests.  
At one site, approximately 2,000,000 Koreans participated in demonstrations 
against the Japanese occupation.  A few hours into the demonstration, the 
Japanese army opened fired and killed many Koreans.  While the Japanese 
officials recorded 553 killed (Matsumura, 2004), Korean historians, on the other 
hand, counted over 7,000 deaths directly related to the Japanese policing (Yang, 
2005).  The stories of the torture and mistreatment of those arrested may be 
forgotten by ordinary Koreans, but the historians did not forget to record these 
facts. 
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The Proclamation of Korean Independence serves as an important mark of 
non-violent movements for Koreans.  There are two reasons for this: first, it 
reinforced the Han sentiment; second, the constant inability to exert a forceful 
pressure on foreigners led to a reticent form of nationalism. 
The Proclamation of Korean Independence, which led the movement, 
called for the use of non-violent tactics to achieve Korean independence.  As 
Devine (1997) puts it: “Patriots issued a declaration in Seoul calling for Korean 
independence to be achieved through peaceful means.”  The Proclamation of 
Korean Independence had these items of agreement: 
This work of ours is in behalf of truth, religion, and life undertaken at the 
request of our people, in order to make known their desire for liberty. Let 
no violence be done to anyone. 
 
Let those who follow us, every man, all the time, every hour, show forth 
with gladness this same mind. 
 
Let all things be done decently and in order, so that our behavior to the 
very end may be honorable and upright. (Lee, 1997). 
 
While there was an emphasis on nonviolence, it was the moral 
understanding of nonviolence that made the movement significant.  Unlike the 
May 4
th
 movement, the first South Korean nationalistic movement focused on 
peaceful means.  The March 1
st
 movement allowed Koreans to think differently 
about demonstrations.  On one hand, they sought to compromise on what they 
could accomplish through nonviolence; on the other hand, they learned that 
change could not come without assertiveness. 
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The Kwangju Student Movement of 1980 
The implications of the March 1
st
 movement were monumental for 
subsequent social movements, one of which, the Kwangju movement, scholars of 
Korean studies often point to.  The Kwangju movement was the most important 
social movement in the 1980s (Han, 1988).  It marked the apex of anti-
Americanism and populist movements in South Korea.  In May 1980, students 
and other laborer unions of the southwestern city of Kwangju protested against 
the Chun government.  They were discontent with the martial law that was 
declared after the coup by President Chun.  Soon after the coup, hundreds of 
South Korean students staged an armed blockade in the city of Kwangju.  The 
students were armed with M-16 rifles and other light infantry weapons.  Fearing 
that the protest could potentially spill over to other cities, President Chun sent 
special troops to put down the riots (Kristof, 1995).  Once the troops arrived, they 
opened fired on the students, and thousands were killed.  While the official 
statistics are not yet known, some scholars of Korean studies argued that more 
than 3,000 students died (Cummings, 2005). 
This event, which formed around an anti-government and anti-Japanese 
faction, had a significant impact on the ignition of nationalism.  However, future 
nationalistic movements proved to be different.  Since that incident, social 
movements took a dynamic shift from being anti-foreign/anti-government to 
adopting a more global-oriented view.  Examples of nationalistic occasions 
include the 2002 FIFA World Cup competition and the U.S.-R.O.K Trade 
Agreement.   By examining these modern cases, one can see how globalization 
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and the advent of information technologies played a pivotal role in inspiring a 
dynamic form of Korean nationalism.   
 
Global Nationalism in South Korea 
Social movements that developed after the 1980s in South Korea were 
affected by various internal and external, economic and political forces.  Since the 
1960s, South Korea has experienced a rapid era of economic growth, leading to a 
focus on development.  This, however, has created an imbalance in the social 
movement culture.  With the advent of information technology, South Koreans 
embraced free-market principles and allowed foreign ideas to flow into the 
country (Choi, 2004).  Therefore, the nationalistic movements that came after the 
Kwangju movement took a dramatic shift from xenophobic sentiment to a more 
moderate and practical form of nationalism. 
A more recent event in South Korea offers a dynamic view of nationalism: 
the surge of national pride displayed during the 2002 FIFA World Cup 
tournament.  During the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Koreans from South Korea and 
Korean Diaspora communities around the world gathered in local Korean 
restaurants and cheered for the Korean national team.  According to the Overseas 
Korean Foundation, the 2002 FIFA World Cup had an impact on the 5.6 million 
overseas Koreans, who felt proud to be Korean (Choi, 2004).  However, Korean 
nationalism shares not only its success but its failures as well. 
The Virginia Tech incident, in which a South Korean University student 
shot and killed over 32 students and professors, showed how the Korean 
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cohesiveness of nationalism could be vulnerable.  When the Virginia Tech 
incident happened, it provoked a strong response from the Korean community 
(both in Korea and across the world).  The responses elicited by the Virginia Tech 
incident demonstrate that Koreans unwillingly share the successes and failures of 
Koreans around the world (Moon, 2006).  The incident also had a political effect 
when South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun issued several official apologies, 
and vigils were held around the United States embassy in Seoul (Lee, 2006).  
Incidents like this demonstrate that Korean nationalism over-emphasizes the 
successes and failures of other Koreans; they forget that they put unnecessary 
pressure on themselves.  This is, however, different from the previous generation.  
The current young generation are different, not only demographically, but also in 
their views on anti-foreign nationalism. 
 
Youth in South Korea: The Reformed Youth 
Like Chinese youth, young Koreans are unique in many ways.  According 
to a Korean scholar from Sung Kyun Kwan University, current young Koreans 
are different from the older generations because they were brought up in an 
affluent and democratized society (Lee, 2006).  In addition, Koreans who are now 
in their 20s were born from the 1970s to 1980s, a period of economic prosperity.  
Most of them have one or no siblings and enjoy educational opportunities that 
their parents did not have.  Therefore, South Korean youth are not able to embrace 
nationalism in two dimensions: assertive nationalism, which is directed at the 
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world and the United States in particular; and inter-Korean nationalism, which 
associates them with the people of North Korea (Lee, 2006). 
One display of assertive nationalism occurred when two schoolgirls were 
accidentally killed during a mine-clearing exercise in a United States military 
base.  A Humvee driven by two United States soldiers ran over the two Korean 
schoolgirls (Kwak & Joo, 2006).  Immediately after, the United States Military 
Tribunal acquitted the two soldiers of the charges, and South Korean University 
student protesters demonstrated and pressured the South Korean government to 
revisit the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (Embassy of Republic of South 
Korea, 1966).  This incident demonstrates how certain events will not be tolerated 
by South Korean youth.  In comparison, inter-Korean nationalism has become 
rather peculiar. 
During the 2000 North-South Korean dialogues, a Two-Korea delegations 
project allowed North Koreans who had been separated by the Korean War, to be 
re united with their South Korean families.  These North Korean families were 
chosen by the North Korean government under strict guidelines.  While the 
participants were selected by the North Korean government, South Korean youth 
groups were sympathetic towards family meetings and did not accuse them of 
spying.  According to Lee (2006), the younger generation’s view of North Korea 
is a post-Cold War view; South Korean youth no longer see the imminent danger, 
but rather sees North Korea as a younger brother in need of help.  And while they 
condemn Kim Jung-il for the current economic crisis, young South Koreans have 
instead turned towards the commonalities of their history.  
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Yet another way of examining South Korean youth nationalism is through 
anti-Americanism.  South Korean anti-Americanism is different from Chinese 
anti-Americanism, because South Korea has been a buffer zone for the Cold War.  
Since the Korean War, United States military bases were built throughout South 
Korea to prevent North Korea from invading.  Currently, approximately 35,000 
United States military personnel are stationed in South Korea (Oberdorfer, 1999, 
p. 108).  And as incidents involving murder, manslaughter, and sex crimes have 
been repeatedly reported without proper justice on and off the military bases, this 
has not only further incited hate against the United States but has strengthened 
anti-foreign nationalism among youth groups. 
From the 2002 FIFA World Cup to the North Korean diplomatic talks, 
South Korean youth groups, amidst socio-economic difficulties, have certainly 
found themselves in the midst of a spiritual pursuit (Lee, 2006, p. 1).  Absorbed in 
the new world-renowned “Korean Wave” pop culture (Hanryu) and virtual 
communities on the Internet, South Korean youth have demonstrated a desire for 
a more open and egalitarian Korea and world (Lee, 2006). 
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Youth Nationalism in the Global Era 
Since the 1990s, information technologies such as cell phones have 
drastically changed the penetration and political mobilization rate in China 
(Zheng, 2008).  The 1999 Belgrade Chinese Embassy incident serves as an 
example. On May 7
th
, 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) jets 
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese 
public service officers. NATO later apologized for the bombing and stated that 
there was an error in logistics by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  
However, few Chinese accepted this explanation.  The Chinese believed that the 
air strike was deliberate.  Moments after the incident, Chinese University students, 
using cell phones and the Internet, organized a mass movement that forced the 
Chinese government to temporarily suspend all diplomatic activity with the 
United States (Hughes, 2006).
 
 This incident clearly illustrated that information 
technology media such as the Internet can increase the rate of mobilization and 
the effects of rumors.  Similar incidents took place as the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
torch relays were going on. The 2008 Beijing torch relays were the first global 
event that occurred when most Chinese and South Korean youth had access to the 
Internet.   
Throughout cities across the world, Chinese protestors, using the Internet 
and other information technology, quickly mobilized to protest against the anti-
Olympic demonstrators.  These protests were not merely a demonstration against 
a foreign force, but a demonstration of national pride.  Young Chinese patriots 
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were able to send their messages to the Western world about Chinese issues in far 
less time than it would have taken before the advent of the Internet. 
On April 27, 2005, in Seoul, South Korea, an incident similar to the Duke 
University incident took place. During the Olympic torch relay, hundreds of 
Chinese foreign exchange students in Seoul clashed with pro-Tibet demonstrators 
and North Korean Refugee protestors (Image 6).  According to a report by The 
New York Times, in one of the incidents, the South Korean police and pro-Tibetan 
demonstrators were overpowered and shoved into a hotel and beaten for more 
than fifteen minutes (Choe, 2008).  In a YouTube clip, two American foreign 
exchange students testified that a mob of Chinese foreign exchange students 
“cornered and beat the opposing protestors with flag poles” (YouTube, 2008).  
They added that their main goals were not to increase racial tension but to show 
the world what the real conditions were like at the Seoul torch relay protests, and 
they concluded by stating that they did not endorse any racism.  These violent 
incidents suggest three underlying reasons: (1) the rumor effect, which can further 
exaggerate information on both sides; (2) possible initiation of violence by the 
Chinese foreign students; and (3) possible instigation by opposing protestors. 
That same week, China Central Television (CCTV) published an article 
about the Chinese torch relay in Seoul.  The July 2008 article showed three photos 
of peaceful Chinese foreign exchange students guarded behind a metal railing 
(China Central Television, 2008).  The photos also showed the Chinese foreign 
exchange students waving both the Chinese and the Korean flags.  On the other 
hand, the South Korean news corporation Your True Network (YTN) reported the 
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incidents as “disturbing and violent.”  This incident was significant for two 
reasons: the media did not provide a fair and balanced report of the story; and, 
second, it ignored how information technologies such as the Internet had become 
a civic platform for managing a political agenda.   
Similar nationalistic protests occurred in Seoul when the United States 
government was in talks with the South Korean government concerning the safety 
of beef imports.  In late April 2008, thousands of South Korean University 
students held vigils and marches to protest the U.S.-R.O.K. Free Trade 
Agreement, which turned out to be one of the largest civilian protests in South 
Korean history.  Later that month, according to a New York Times article, 
approximately half a million angry South Korean University demonstrators 
protested in Jongryo, a location where many Koreans often gather for special 
occasions (Image 2).  However, during the demonstrations, violent clashes 
between the students and the police were reported.  According to a New York 
Times article, the students were fighting with the police with metal sticks and 
assaults and injuries were reported (Choi, 2008). 
While these belligerent actions by Chinese and South Korean University students 
were seen as vigilant shadows of discontent, these actions demonstrate that the 
Internet can influence nationalistic sentiments.  The interaction of the “Minzhu 
zhuyi” (which means “democracy” or “people’s place”) and the “Quanqiuhua” 
(in Mandarin) or “Saegaehwa” (in Korean—which means “globalization”) were 
the two most important mechanisms that brought out the sudden outbursts of 
anger.  Whether it was against other ethnic groups or their own government, the 
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hair-trigger, violent, and illogical resentment that formed around these events 
was, indeed, caused by the extrapolation of deconstructive nationalism (Hughes, 
2006).  The emergence of the deconstructive nationalistic sentiment suggests that 
the newly introduced information technologies, such as the Internet, might have 
had an influence on the youth population.  Consequently, it is important to 
examine the development of the Internet in China and South Korea.  In the 
following chapter, I discuss some of the major developments of the Internet in 
China and South Korea. 
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Cyber Activity in China and South Korea 
The impact of the Internet on political mobilization in China and South 
Korea has received world-wide scholastic attention since its introduction.  For 
instance, scholars like Han (2007) examined how Internet exposure affected 
political voting behavior.  Yang (2003) examined how the Internet contributed to 
the formation of civil society.  However, compared with the issues mentioned in 
the previous section, news on growing Internet use in China and South Korea has 
garnered little attention. 
In 2002, Netratings press released a report that China had the world’s 
second largest number of Internet users: 56.6 million (Zheng, 2007, p. 135).  But 
given the fact that this was only a fragment of China’s population, many scholars 
predicted this number would increase in the near future.  On the other hand, South 
Korea was reported as one of the countries with the highest penetration rates in 
the world (Opennet Initiative, 2007).  According to Ho et al. (2003), the 
technological accomplishments by both countries not only changed civil society, 
but also changed the dynamics of the global digital divide in Asia (Ho et. al., 
2003, p. 24-25).   
According to John Dewey, the Internet in China has evolved through a 
prolonged battle between democracy and science.  In his research he uses a 
Zheng’s analogy to describe the current state and civil society relations on 
information technology.  According to Zheng, the struggle between the state and 
civil society can be seen as Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy were differentiated 
from roles in helping Chinese political elites in pursuing power and wealth 
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(Zheng, 2007, p. 2).  For instance, according to Zheng (2007), the radicalization 
of Mr. Democracy came from the May 4
th
 movement, which later led to the belief 
in populism and proletarian dictatorship and, ultimately, to the ideology of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  On the other hand, the movement also held the 
belief that democracy would be impossible without science and technology.  This 
belief was reflected in the fact that Chinese scientists joined the May 4
th
 
movement, advocating for political liberalization and democratization.   
Therefore, the current situation of science and technology goes back to the 
century-old question stemming from the May 4
th
 movement: How much can the 
Chinese Communist Party CCP (Mr. Democracy) embrace information 
technology (Mr. Science)? 
It is, however, safe to say that the Chinese government made some 
progress in liberalizing information.  An obvious example is the allowance of 
ordinary citizens to gain Internet access.  However, this only came recently when 
new policy agendas were set up by the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership since 
2000 (Zheng, 2007, p. 3).  Believing that scientific and technological 
developments such as the Internet are tools for progress, the new leadership 
gradually liberalized information technologies. 
In the early stages of China’s Internet development, very few people had 
access—only scientists, researchers, and university faculty members located in 
major metropolitan areas.  However, as a result of the opening of China’s 
economy in the 1990s, the number of Internet users increased dramatically.  For 
instance, China Telecom’s move to privatize had a ripple effect on the Internet 
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service provider (ISP) sector. The privatization of China Telecom created a 
market for Internet services (Zheng, 2007, p. 136).   
In March 1995, approximately 3,000 people had access to the Internet.  
Four months later, that number had increased to 400,000 (Chen, 1999).  And by 
1997, China had experienced an explosive increase in Internet users.  Figures 1 
and 2 show the increase in Internet usage among Chinese and South Korean users.  
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Figure 1. Growing Internet Usage in China (in millions). 
Source: CNNIC survey reports: 2008 summary survey report. 
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Figure 2. Growing Internet Usage in South Korea since 1999 (in millions) 
Source: Korean Network Information Center 
 
However, it seems that the penetration rate for the South Koreans is much 
higher than the Chinese.  According to Korean census data, there were 48 million 
Koreans in South Korea (Korean Network Information Center, 2008).  And, as 
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shown in Figure 2, there were approximately 32 out of 48 million Koreans with 
access to the Internet, whereas China, a country with almost 1.3 billion people, 
had only 79 million people with access to the Internet in 2004.  Therefore, the 
penetration rate was higher for the South Koreans than for the Chinese. 
However, China and South Korea have something in common: the 
demographics of the typical Internet user.  The Chinese Internet Information 
Center (CNNIC) observed that the typical Internet user in China is relatively 
young, with a University education (Chinese Internet Information Center, 2008).  
Similarly, South Korea published an annual report confirming the typical Internet 
user to be young. 
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Figure 3. Internet Usage in China by Age, 2008 (in millions) 
Source: CNNIC survey reports: 2008 summary survey report 
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Figure 4. Internet Usage in South Korea by Age, 2008 (in millions) 
Source: Korean Network Information Center. 
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China and South Korea are two important countries in Asia because 
together they make up about 41.1% of the world’s Internet users (Internet World 
Statistics, 2006).  For example, South Korea has ranked first in connectivity rate 
and 3
rd
 in broadband networks (Kim, 2004).  On the other hand, China is expected 
to have the largest Internet user population in the world (Zheng, 2007, p. 135).  
Although these changes might seem significant, it is important to realize the 
potentials that information technologies could have for shaping civil society. 
The belief that information technologies have a mischievous potential to 
influence nationalism has created a heated debate among scholars (Guo et al., 
2007).  On the one hand, there is a debate over whether the Internet and other 
information technologies can easily fall prey to the schemes of political 
authorities to direct nationalistic fanaticism.  On the other hand, scholars like 
Zheng (2008) propose a theory of partial technological empowerment, where 
information technology can only partially empower a society.  Therefore, this 
research poses two significant questions: If there is partial technological 
empowerment in China, what is the relationship between Internet exposure and 
nationalism?  And how will it differ from the relationship in neighboring 
countries like South Korea? 
Based on this literature review, I tested three hypotheses that measured 
Internet exposure and nationalistic sentiment: First, I predicted that Yonsei 
University (South Korean) students would demonstrate higher Internet exposure 
(yesterday, typical day, and long-term) than Tsinghua University (Chinese) 
students. Second, building on the premise that that the Internet is tightly 
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controlled by the Chinese government, partly with the goal of promoting state-
aligned nationalism, I predicted that Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and 
long-term) would be positively related to both general and blind nationalism 
among Tsinghua University (Chinese) students. Third, I predicted the relationship 
between Internet exposure and general and blind nationalism among Yonsei 
University (South Korean) students to be weaker than that among Tsinghua 
University (Chinese) students, because the South Korean Internet is less 
controlled by the government. 
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2 
________ 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
 
The study was conducted throughout public areas such as gymnasiums, 
dining halls, classrooms, and dorm rooms on the Tsinghua and Yonsei University 
campuses.  The initial student samples at Tsinghua and Yonsei Universities were 
targeted at 600.  However, due to time constraints and difficulties collecting 
completed surveys, only 192 surveys were collected on the Tsinghua University 
campus and 195 surveys on the Yonsei University campus. 
There were three eligibility criteria for inclusion in this research: Chinese 
and South Korean ethnicity, age in the range from 18 to 25, and university student 
status at Tsinghua University or Yonsei University.  Data for this study were 
collected from November 21
st
 to the last week of December 2008.  Through the 
networks of my professors at Tsinghua University and Yonsei University, I was 
able to gain considerable access to the student population.  In addition, since this 
research was conducted 3 months after the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 4 months 
after the U.S.-R.O.K Trade Agreement negotiations, it attempted to capture the 
sentiments of nationalism soon after a patriotic event.  Tsinghua University is one 
of many elite universities in China.  Likewise, Yonsei University is one of many 
top-ranking universities in South Korea.  Consequently, this research took a 
43 
 
convenience sample of students at two elite institutions.  The convenience sample 
means that I choose the location and time of sampling. 
Since the surveys were translated from English into Mandarin and Korean, 
they were pre-tested on 12 Chinese and South Korean Syracuse University 
students in the United States.  The Chinese surveys were translated by two 
professors, a Chinese language teacher from the Syracuse University Language 
Department and a Chinese Professor from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School.  
I translated the Korean surveys.  Students from Tsinghua University and Yonsei 
University did not observe any differences or problems between the translated 
surveys when they were presented with the English version. 
However, there were some difficulties conducting surveys on Tsinghua 
University campus.  Some Tsinghua University students thought the surveys were 
sensitive.  For instance, some older students refused to complete the survey 
because they stated that it could hurt their employment opportunities in the future.  
Environmental science and forestry majors also refused to complete the survey 
because they thought it would damage their reputations in the future.  For 
instance, approximately 20 surveys were attempted on an environmental club on 
Tsinghua University campus, but almost all members of the club refused to 
complete the survey or rejected it entirely because they thought they would be 
punished by the government.  In another case, a classroom of 80 graduate students 
was surveyed, but only about 20 of them filled out the surveys completely.  Only 
5 South Koreans did not fill out the surveys completely.  If a survey form had 3 or 
more items unanswered, it was considered incomplete. 
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Of the 192 students in the sample from Tsinghua University, 107 were 
male, 85 were female, and all identified themselves as Han Chinese.  Of the 195 
students in the sample of Yonsei University, 100 were male, 95 were female and 
all identified themselves as South Korean.  In total, there were 207 males and 180 
females in the survey. 
The statistics from the Tsinghua University website showed some 
similarities to the data collected.  As of 2006, the demographic status of Tsinghua 
University stated that there were approximately 13,000 undergraduates, 13,000 
graduates and 1,700 International students registered on campus.  According to 
the same website, the male-to-female ratio was 2 to 1 (Tsinghua University, 
2007).  However, the data collected seem problematic, because only 109 male 
students and 84 female students were recorded.   Therefore, the gender ratio of the 
data collected had some similarity with the statistics on the Tsinghua University 
website.  This means that the sample was partially representative. 
The age categories were problematic.  According to the data collected, 106 
Tsinghua University students reported their age as 18-20, 61 reported their age as 
20-22, and 25 reported their age as 23-25.  Assuming that undergraduates’ studies 
took four years to complete and most freshmen entered college at the age of 18 or 
19, I predicted that the age range of 23-25 would represent the graduate 
population.  As demonstrated on the Tsinghua University website, 46% of the 
student body was graduate students, but the data collected only represented 12% 
of students from the age range 23-25.  Therefore, the sample only moderately 
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resembled the proportions given on the Tsinghua University website (Tsinghua 
University, 2007). 
A comparison of the demographics on Yonsei University students and the 
population sample for the data collected showed some similarity.  According to 
the Yonsei University website, there were 18,588 undergraduates, 10,498 
graduates, and 4,237 foreign students registered as students in 2008.  And 
according to the data collected, 25 Yonsei University students reported their age 
as 18-20, 72 reported their age as 20-22, and 98 reported their age as 23-25.  
While the data collected did not seem to match the demographics reported on the 
Yonsei website, it is important to note that South Korea has mandatory military 
service.  Therefore, all males older than 18 years of age must serve in the military 
for 2 and half years.  That means undergraduate students can be as old as 25.  
Therefore, it is difficult to judge the representativeness of the sample.  However, 
since the website reported the gender ratio, I was able to compare the statistics on 
the websites with the data collected.  The data collected closely match the gender 
ratio provided on the website.  The website reported the male-to-female gender 
ratio at 1.3:1, and the data collected came from 100 male students and 95 female 
students, 1: .95 respectively. 
As shown on the Tsinghua and the Yonsei University websites, the 
demographics of the two universities’ students were fairly proportionate to the 
percentage in the data collected.  And because this research was exploratory, it 
only conveyed a correlation between students at Tsinghua and Yonsei 
Universities.  This paper does not draw any conclusions about causation.    
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Measurement 
In order to examine computer-meditated communication (CMC) motives, 
I used a questionnaire and two scales to test my hypotheses: a demographic 
questionnaire, a political-psychology scale, and an Internet exposure scale.  The 
survey, therefore, was constructed by combining a questionnaire with two 
established scales. 
The first of three instruments was the demographic questionnaire, which 
asked about age, gender, income, religion, and other background information.  
Respondents answered in multiple-choice fashion (i.e., A. Male or B. Female).  
The second scale was on general nationalism.  This scale asked five questions 
using a five-point Likert-scale (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree).  The 
general nationalism scale was taken from the works of Smith et al. (Schatz et al. 
1999; Smith et al., 2006, p. 8).  This scale had five questions on general 
nationalistic sentiment.  The third scale was an 18-item questionnaire on blind 
nationalism developed by Schatz et al. (1999).  Respondents were asked 18 
questions using a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly agree to 5= strongly 
disagree).  The results from this scale were compared with the results from the 
scale on Internet exposure.  The last scale was the Internet exposure scale, 
adapted from Yang et al. (2000).  The scale was based on a questionnaire asking 
how long the respondent had used the Internet, in terms of yesterday, on a typical 
day, and over months and years.    
After inputting the data into a SPSS file, I ran a test of the internal 
consistency of the two scales on nationalism.  A Chronbach’s alpha of 0.556 for 
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the Tsinghua University students and of 0.538 for the Yonsei University students 
indicated moderate levels of internal consistency for the general nationalism 
scales.  
Table 5. Chronbach’s Alpha on General and Blind  nationalism Items. 
 
General Nationalism 
  Items           Tsinghua University   Yonsei University 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. I would rather be a citizen of China/South Korea than of any other country in the world.                      
2. There are some things about China/South Korea today that makes me ashamed of.                
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like China/South Korea Nationality. 
4. Generally, speaking China/South Korea is a better country than most other countries.                  
5. People should support China/South Korea even if the country is in the wrong.                   
            (.556)                     (.538) 
Blind Nationalism Items 
 
1. Chinese/South Koreans who do not wholeheartedly support China/South Korea should live elsewhere.         
2. China/South Korea is virtually always right.                      
3. I would support China/South Korea right or wrong.                                     
4. For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against China/South Korea’s policies are good, upstanding, 
intelligent people.                 
5. I believe that China/South Korea’s policies are almost always the morally correct ones.         
6. If another country disagreed with an important China/South Korea’s policy that I knew little about, I would not 
necessarily support China/South Korea’s position.               
7. People should not constantly try to change the way things are in China/South Korea.                  
8. I support my China/South Korea’s policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.                 
9. There is too much criticism of China/South Korea in the world, and we citizens should not criticize it.                 
10. It is un-Chinese/South Korean to criticize China/South Korea.                    
11. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize China/South Korea.                  
12. Because I identify with China/South Korea, some of its actions make me feel sad.                   
13. People should work hard to move China/South Korea in a positive direction.                   
14. If you love China/South Korea, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.                   
15. If I criticize China/South Korea, I do so out of love for my country.                      
16. I oppose some country’s policies because I care about China/South Korea and want to improve it.                   
17. I express my love for China/South Korea by supporting efforts at positive change.                     
18. My love of China/South Korea demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive policies.      
             (.720)                  (.589) 
 
As for blind nationalism, a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.720 for the Tsinghua 
University students indicated internal consistency, while a Chronbach’s alpha of 
0.589 for the Yonsei University students indicated moderate internal consistency. 
48 
 
Results 
Bivariate Analysis - Study 1 Internet Exposure and Ethnicity 
The first hypothesis examined the relationship between Internet exposure and 
ethnicity.  The values for Internet exposure (yesterday and  typical day) were 
coded into 13 values: 0=0 min, 1=1-15 min, 2=16-30 min, 3=31-45 min, 4=46-60 
min, 5=61-75 min, 6=76-90 min, 7=91-105 min, 8=106-115 min, 9=116-130 min, 
10=131-145 min, 11=146-150 min, 12=151-165 min, and 13=166 min or more.  
The categories were spaced according to 14-minute time slots.  Internet exposure 
(long-term) was coded into 7 values: 1= <1 year, 2=1-3 years, 3=3.1-5 years, 
4=5.1-7 years, 5=7.1-9 years, 6=9.1-11 years, and 7=11.1 years or more. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Ethnicity and Internet Exposure1 
Ethnicity of Students Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ethnicity of Students 1 1 1.00 .000 
Internet Exposure 
 (yesterday) 
.00 13 7.8691 6.69475 
Internet Exposure  
(typical day) 
.00 13 10.5573* 7.44100 
Tsinghua 
University 
students 
Internet Exposure 
(long-term) 
0 11 3.87* 1.399 
Ethnicity of Students 2 2 2.00 .000 
Internet Exposure 
 (yesterday) 
.00 13 8.4762 6.74424 
Internet Exposure  
(typical day) 
.00 13 12.7819 8.77224 
Internet Exposure 
(long-term) 
0 11 5.85 1.361 
Yonsei 
University 
students 
     
 
Therefore, the amount of Internet exposure (yesterday and typical day) can 
be determined by taking the mean and multiplying it by the coded values.  The 
                                                 
1*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Tsinghua University students averaged 7.86, or about 91 to 105 minutes for 
yesterday Internet exposure, and Yonsei University students 8.47, or about 106 to 
115 minutes for yesterday.  This difference was not statistically significant.  
However, the differences in typical day exposure and long-term exposure were 
statistically significant. Yonsei University students scored 2.23 points, or about 30 
minutes higher on Internet exposure in terms of a typical day than Tsinghua 
University students.  The data also showed that Tsinghua University students 
averaged 3.87, or about 3.1-5.1 years for Internet exposure (long-term), whereas 
the Yonsei University students reported 5.85, or about 7.1-9.1 years.  These 
statistics supported Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Internet Exposure and General and Blind Nationalism 
Findings for the relationship between Internet exposure (typical day and long-
term) and both general and blind nationalism were nonsignificant for Tsinghua 
University students.  As shown on Table 7, all the correlations were 
nonsignificant and negative.  There were three highest negative correlations: 
Internet exposure (yesterday) and blind nationalism was 0.111; Internet exposure 
(yesterday) and general nationalism was -0.114; and Internet exposure (typical 
day) and general nationalism was -0.120.  
The Tsinghua University students scored significantly lower than the 
Yonsei University students, with the exception of Internet exposure (long-term) 
and blind nationalism.  These numbers indicate that, contrary to Hypothesis 2, the 
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association between Internet exposure (yesterday) and nationalism for Tsinghua 
University students was of negligible magnitude, negative rather than positive.   
However, in contrast to the findings for Tsinghua University students, the 
relationship between the three measures of Internet exposure and the two 
measures of nationalism among Yonsei University students were positive in all 
but one case, and statistically significant in Internet exposure (typical day) and 
blind nationalism. The significant association was the relationship between 
Internet exposure (typical day) and blind nationalism, which had a correlation 
coefficient of 0.155.  In one instance, Internet exposure (typical day) and blind 
nationalism, the relationship was actually stronger. The findings did not support 
Hypothesis 3.
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Table 7. Bivariate Analysis on Tsinghua and Yonsei University students. 
 
To explore whether the scores for Tsinghua University students were 
insignificant, I ran cross-tabulations for each items on the general nationalism 
scale.  By taking a closer look at each item, I expected that it would yield a 
different result.  Since this research began with the premise that Internet exposure 
is related to nationalism, cross-tabulations of general nationalism were tested to 
Ethnicity of Students 
Blind 
Nationalism 
General 
National 
Pride Yesterday 
Typical 
day 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .665** -.111 -.064 
Blind Nationalism 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .127 .378 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.665** 1 -.114 -.120 
 General Nationalism 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .115 .098 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.111 -.114 1 .704** 
Internet Exposure (Yesterday) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .127 .115  .000 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.064 -.120 .704** 1 
Internet Exposure (Typical day) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .378 .098 .000  
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.009 -.092 .170* .212** 
Tsinghua 
University 
students 
Inter Exposure (Long-term) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .904 .206 .018 .003 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .563** .121 .155* 
Blind Nationalism 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .105 .036 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.563** 1 .069 .071 
 General Nationalism 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .356 .342 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.121 .069 1 .576** 
Internet Exposure (Yesterday) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .105 .356  .000 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.155* .071 .576** 1 
Internet Exposure (Typical day) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .342 .000  
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.066 .080 -.090 -.127 
Sig. (2-tailed) .376 .283 .217 .081 
Yonsei 
University 
students 
Inter Exposure (Long-term) 
     
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
52 
 
better examine the differences between the Tsinghua and Yonsei University 
students.  I focused on general nationalism because the items on general 
nationalism asked questions about the unquestioning loyalty of one’s nationality.  
Tables 8 through 12 show the results for cross-tabulations of the five items from 
the general nationalism scale. 
Table 8. Cross-tabulations on Ethnicity and General National Pride Item 1. 
Count 
 
I would rather be a citizen of my country than of any other country in the world. 
  Strongly 
Agree/Agree No Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree/Disagree Total 
Tsinghua 
students 
82.8% 14.6% 2% 192 
Yonsei 
students 
36.9% 30.2% 37.9% 195 
Ethnicity of  
Students 
     
 
 
Table 9. Cross-tabulations on Ethnicity and General National Pride Item 2.  
Count  There are some things about my country today that makes me ashamed. 
  Strongly 
Agree/Agree No Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree/Disagree Total 
Tsinghua 
students 
55.7% 25.5% 18.7% 192 
Yonsei 
students 
77.4% 14.3% 8.2% 195 
Ethnicity of  
Students 
     
  
 
Table 11. Cross-tabulations on Ethnicity and General National Pride Item 4.  
Count  Generally, speaking my country is a better country than most other countries. 
  Strongly 
Agree/Agree No Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree/Disagree Total 
Tsinghua 
students 
56.8% 32.3% 11% 192 
Yonsei students 35.4% 35.9% 28.7% 195 
Ethnicity of 
Students 
     
 
Table 10.  Cross-tabulations on Ethnicity and General National Pride Item 3.  
Count 
 The world will be a better place if people from other countries were more like my 
nationality. 
  Strongly 
Agree/Agree No Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree/Disagree Total 
Tsinghua students 34.9% 37.5% 27.6% 192 
Yonsei students 12.3% 38.5% 49.2% 195 
Ethnicity of 
Students 
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Table 12. Cross-tabulations on Ethnicity and General National Pride Item 5.  
Count  People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. 
  Strongly 
Agree/Agree No Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree/Disagree Total 
Tsinghua 
students 
23.9% 30.7% 45.3% 192 
Yonsei 
students 
26.2% 12.8% 61% 195 
Ethnicity of  
Students 
     
 
 
As shown above, the cross-tabulations on ethnicity and general 
nationalism show that the Tsinghua University students were more nationalistic 
than the Yonsei University students on four of the five questions.  
When the Tsinghua and Yonsei University students were prompted with “I 
would rather be a citizen of my country than of any other country in the world,” 
an overwhelming 82.8% of the Tsinghua University students indicated that they 
“strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement.  On the other hand, only about 
36.9% of the total sample of Yonsei University students indicated that they 
strongly agree or agree with the statement. 
However, when both groups of university students responded to the 
prompt, “There are some things about my country today that makes me ashamed” 
more Yonsei University students reported “strongly agree” and “agree” than their 
Tsinghua counterparts.  About 55.7% of the Tsinghua University students 
indicated that they strongly agree or agree with the statement.  On the other hand, 
77.4% of the total sample of Yonsei University students indicated that they 
strongly agree or agree with the statement. 
When the Tsinghua University students were asked, “The world will be a 
better place if people from other countries were more like my nationality,” 34.9% 
54 
 
of the Tsinghua University students chose the answer “strongly agree” or “agree,” 
whereas 12.3% of Yonsei University students chose “strongly agree” or “agree.”   
In response to the item, “Generally, China/South Korea was better than 
other countries,” about 56.8% of Tsinghua University students chose the answer 
“strongly agree” or “agree,” whereas only 35.4% of Yonsei University students 
chose the answer “strongly agree” or “agree.” 
However, on the item, “People should support their country right or 
wrong,” students from the both universities demonstrated roughly equal levels of 
general nationalistic sentiment: 23.9% of the Tsinghua University students chose 
“strongly agree” or “agree,” and 26.2% Yonsei University students chose the 
answer “strongly agree” or “agree.” 
By examining the data individually, more analysis can be drawn.  For 
instance, the Tsinghua University students were more likely to demonstrate 
nationalism than the Yonsei University students.  The only item where Yonsei 
University outscored Tsinghua University students was: “There are some things 
about my country today that makes me ashamed.”  On this item, more Yonsei 
University students answered “strongly agree” or “agree” than the Tsinghua 
University students.  It is important to note that individual items can help us 
reconsider the aim of the research.  Therefore, it is always useful to examine the 
data for each item individually. 
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Discussion 
I predicted that Yonsei University students would demonstrate higher 
Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and long-term) than Tsinghua 
University students.  As shown in Table 6, Yonsei University students 
demonstrated a higher mean on Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and 
long-term) than Tsinghua University students, although the difference between 
the means for exposure yesterday were not statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
first hypothesis was generally supported by the data. 
Internet exposure (yesterday, typical day, and long-term) was inversely 
related to both general and blind nationalism among Tsinghua University 
students, and the relationship was insignificant.  Therefore, the data did not 
support Hypothesis 2. 
The relationship between Internet exposure and general and blind 
nationalism among Yonsei University students was generally positive and 
significant between Internet Exposure (Typical day) and Blind Nationalism, 
indicating a closer link between Internet exposure and general and blind 
nationalism among Yonsei University students than among Tsinghua University 
students.  Therefore, the third hypothesis was also not supported by the data. 
 Our choice of the two specific events, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 
U.S.-R.O.K Trade Agreements, illustrates the points made in the literature review.  
These events were different in nature from other nationalistic movements and 
received little media coverage.  While there were no specific questions relating to 
these events, I expected to find a difference in Internet exposure and nationalism 
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between Tsinghua and Yonsei University students.  And since this was a 
convenience sample, there were limitations to this research.  Such limitations 
include representative sampling and time order. 
While there might be various reasons why the hypotheses were not 
supported, one could be that the convenience sample was not representative.  
Another reason could be sociological.  For instance, event-induced nationalism 
could have had a different impact on the different student populations in Beijing.  
Or it could be that the relationship between Internet exposure and nationalism 
differs for elite students, compared to the general populations of China and South 
Korea.  University students with certain academic backgrounds might have felt 
apathetic towards these events, whereas other students with different backgrounds 
might have felt more passionate.  Or it could be that the media did not adequately 
cover the events.  Since the purpose of the events varies not only by narrative but 
also by context, specific event framing could have had an impact on how 
University students perceive nationalistic events in both countries. 
Future research should probe these questions further.  For instance, if there 
were to be follow-up research, it should aim to use a representative sample.  Also, 
if the researchers want to gather specific data about nationalistic events, they 
should conduct surveys immediately after these events had occurred.  In addition, 
data on the general population in Beijing and elsewhere can be helpful when 
interpreting any cross-population correlations.  These methods can not only yield 
supplementary data but also accurate and reliable results. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Image 1. Grace Wang tried to talk to Chinese demonstrators at a pro-Tibetan rally at Duke 
University. 
 
Source: See Dewan/Zachary Tracer/The Duke Chronicle 
 
Image 2. [South Korean] demonstrators throw stones and wield sticks to destroy a police bus in 
downtown Seoul, during a rally against American beef imports. 
Source: See Rhan, Korea Times Photo by Hong In-Kee 
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Image 3. Man carries dead child. 
 
Source: See United Human Rights Council 
 
Image 4. Good America: The “Goddess of Democracy” 1989. Mao looks on as students protest in 
Tiananmen Square during Beijing Spring.   
 
Source: See Gries, 2004 Photo courtesy of AP/ World Wide Photos. 
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Image 5. The Statue of Liberty did not always symbolize U.S. virtue. In 1999, Chinese students 
converted it into the “Demon of Liberty” to protest the U.S. bombing of China's embassy in 
Belgrade.  
 
Source: See Gries, 2004; original source unknown. 
 
Image 6. Chinese students attack a South Korean man who was protesting against China’s human 
rights after the start of the Olympic torch relay at Seoul Olympic Park on April 27, 2008, in Seoul, 
South Korea. 
 
Source:  See Epoch Times article (Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images) 
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Image 7. Thousands of demonstrators crowded the streets of central London as the Olympic torch 
was carried through the city on its way to the summer Olympic Games in Beijing. 
 
Source: New York Times April 8
th
 2008 article/ Felipe Trueba/European Press photo Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
This section asks demographic questions.  Please answer the following questions by 
circling the most accurate answer in blue or black ink pen.   
 
1. What is your gender? 
-        Female     -        Male 
 
2. What is your racial/ethnic background? 
-        Han Chinese    -        South Korean 
 -       Mixed Asian Heritage: ___________ -        Other:_________________ 
 
3. What religion do you most closely identify? 
-        Christianity 
-        Buddhism 
-        Other:___________________________ 
 
4. Approximately what is your parents’ yearly income? 
-        Less than 19, 000 
-        20,000- 39,000 
-        40,000-84,999 
-        85,000- 149,000 
-        150,000 or more 
 
5. What is your college/graduate school major? 
 
______________________________________ 
 
6. What year are you in school? 
-        Freshman 
-        Sophomore 
-        Junior 
-        Senior 
-        Graduate Student 
 
7. What is your age? 
- 18-20   - 20-22   - 22-25 
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Appendix B 
 
GENERAL NATIONAL PRIDE  
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
A – “I feel I…”  
B=Strongly Agree   C=Agree   D=No opinion   E=Disagree   F=Strongly Disagree 
 
1. I would rather be a citizen of China/South Korea than of any other country in the 
world.       
 
2. There are some things about your country today that makes me ashamed of 
China/South Korea.       
 
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were  
more like Chinese/South Korean. 
 
4. Generally, speaking China/South Korea is a better country than most other 
countries.  
 
5. People should support China/South Korea even if the country is in the wrong.  
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Appendix C 
 
1. People who do not wholeheartedly support China/South Korea should live 
elsewhere.  
2. China/South Korea is virtually always right.  
3. I would support China/South Korea right or wrong.  
4. For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against the China/South 
Korea’s policy are good, upstanding, intelligent people.  
5. I believe that China/South Korea’s policies are almost always the morally correct 
ones.  
6. If another country disagreed with an important China/South Korea’s policy that I 
knew little about, I would not necessarily support China/South Korea’s position.  
7. People should not constantly try to change the way things are in China/South 
Korea.  
8. I support China/South Korea’s policies for the very reason that they are the policies 
of China/South Korea.  
9. There is too much criticism of China/South Korea in the world, and we its citizens 
should not criticize it.  
10. It is un-Chinese/South Korean to criticize this country.  
11. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the 
country.  
12. Because I identify with China/South Korea, some of its actions make me feel sad.  
13. People should work hard to move China/South Korea in a positive direction.  
14. If you love China/South Korea, you should notice its problems and work to 
correct them.  
15. If I criticize China/South Korea, I do so out of love for my country.  
16. I oppose China/South Korea’s policies because I care about my country and want 
to improve it. 
17. I express my love for China/South Korea by supporting efforts at positive 
change.  
18. My love of China/South Korea demands that I speak out against popular but 
potentially destructive policies. 
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Appendix D 
 
1. How long have you used the Internet (for example, e-mail, newsgroups / bulletin 
boards / list servers, chat rooms, browsing, downloading, etc.)? 
 
___________________________years _____________________ months 
 
 
2. Now think about how much you use the Internet on an average day. Please 
indicate the number of minutes you used different Internet functions by filling out 
the blanks in the following questions.  
 
 
In a typical day, on average, how much time do you spend on: 
 
E-mailing:       __________minutes 
 
Chatting/Instant Messenger:     __________minutes 
 
Reading online news:      __________minutes 
 
Browsing websites:     __________minutes 
 
Downloading music, games, or videos:   __________minutes 
 
Other Internet Use:      __________minutes 
 
Please specify: ______________________ (e.g., online shopping, blogging etc.) 
  
 
Yesterday, how much time do you spend on: 
 
E-mailing:       __________minutes  
 
Chatting/Instant Messenger:     __________minutes 
 
Reading online news:      __________minutes 
 
Browsing websites:     __________minutes 
 
Downloading music, games, or videos:   __________minutes 
 
Other Internet Use:      __________minutes  
 
Please specify: _____________________ (e.g., online shopping, blogging, etc.) 
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________ 
CAPSTONE SUMMARY 
 
Ever since the Internet was introduced in 1990s, scholars and policy 
makers have published works that examined its impact on various parts of state 
and society.  Highlighting the transformation in Asia, scholars like K.C. Ho, 
Randolph Kluver, and Kenneth C.C. Yang (2003) have offered case studies about 
the Internet in East Asia in their book Asia.com: Asia encounters the Internet.  
With reservation, scholars like Zheng also made claims about Chinese cyber-
activism.  He argued that Chinese society can only be partially empowered by the 
Internet.  In other words, empowerment via the Internet has been qualified 
because of government regulations (Zheng, 2007). 
Other scholars, like Han, have examined specific cases when the Internet 
influenced policy elections outcomes (Han, 2007).  However, even with the 
current research overlaps between Western and East Asian nations, there are 
many social, political, and historical variables that are left unconsidered.  These 
variables carry a subtle or latent characteristic and are often left ignored.  
Therefore this research aims to fill in the gap in the literature by identifying the 
effects of the Internet on newly networked countries (NCN) like China and South 
Korea. 
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Research Aim and Approach 
The purpose of this research paper was to examine modern Technological 
causes of active nationalism in China and South Korea.  Examining the sources of 
civic activism, this paper deploys an extensive historical analysis and quantitative 
approach.  I first summarize the historical and cultural dynamics of Chinese and 
South Korean University students.  Here also, to shed new light from a 
comparative perspective, I examine South Korean cyber-activism.  I then ask two 
general questions: Does the theory of political liberalization by Zheng accurately 
depict China’s cyber-experience? Or are there other factors that generate a new 
form of nationalism? 
The quantitative portion examines three factors: first the overall exposure 
of the Internet both groups; second, the Chinese students’ level of Internet 
exposure, in contrast to their level of nationalism; third, the Chinese students’ 
levels of Internet exposure and blind nationalism, compared to those of South 
Korean students.  While some people might ask why Tsinghua University and 
Yonsei University were chosen, it was because students in these schools have 
been historically affiliated with massive movements in both countries.  The 
second reasons why they were chosen were because the political and bureaucratic 
leaders of both countries are often the graduates of these two Universities.   
Lastly, the two elite colleges embodied an international-oriented, elitist, and tech-
savvy student population, which was measured by considering the number of 
foreign students and national ranking. 
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Quantitative Section 
In order to examine the motives for computer-meditated communication 
(CMC), I used a demographic questionnaire and two established instruments by 
Yang et al. (2000), which were a combination of a demographic instrument, 
political-psychological instrument, and a questionnaire on Internet exposure.  The 
survey, therefore, was constructed by combining one questionnaire on 
demographics and two established instruments from previous studies.  The first of 
the three instruments asked for basic information like age, gender, income, 
religion, and so forth. The second questionnaire assessed general nationalism.  
Here, respondents were asked 18 questions using a five-point Likert scale 
(5=strongly like to 1=strongly dislike).  The last scale was the Internet exposure 
scale, adapted from Yang et al. (2000).  The question on long-term Internet 
exposure asked how long the respondent had used the Internet, in terms of years 
and months.  For the daily exposure section, I averaged the amount of Internet 
exposure based on the total number of years and months and on the amount of use 
yesterday and on a typical day in hours and minutes.   
 
Potential Benefits of the Research 
While this research looked at the relationship between Internet exposure 
and nationalism in China and South Korea, this paper can be useful when other 
researchers study North Korean elite students and students in other developing 
countries.  Building on the premise that the Chinese and North Koreans have 
similar charaterisitcs (i.e., state-aligned propaganda, censorship, and lack of 
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freedom of expression), this research can potentially be used to contribute to 
future studies that examine the implications of the introduction of information 
technology. 
This data can also be used as a recommendation for future web 
programmers to better tailor websites and to create a more user-friendly 
cyberspace.  It is hoped that through this research both Chinese and South Korean 
University students will appreciate and understand each other’s cyber and civic 
cultures. 
 
